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| 2026-01-24 15:12:56
(News Focus) US strategy-S Korea
(News Focus) New U.S. strategy signals USFK posture 'upgrade,' ups pressure on S. Korea to boost defense capabilities
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 (Yonhap) -- A new U.S. defense strategy signaled a possible adjustment to U.S. force posture in South Korea and added pressure on the Asian ally to boost its conventional defense capabilities to counter North Korean threats, as Washington seeks to focus on deterring China, analysts said Saturday.
On Friday, the Pentagon released the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), saying that South Korea is capable of taking "primary" responsibility to deter the North with "critical, but more limited" U.S. support -- a shift that it says is in line with America's interest in "updating" U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula.
The latest NDS is in sync with U.S. President Donald Trump's America First policy that calls for allies to do more for their own defense at a time when President Lee Jae Myung seeks to reinforce South Korea's independent defense capabilities and retake wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States.
"This signals a shift in U.S. strategic focus, which requires a recalibration of responsibilities within the alliance. Under this new division of labor, South Korea will step up and bolster its national defense capabilities to take the lead in addressing North Korea's conventional threats," Ellen Kim, director of academic affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of Korea, told Yonhap News Agency.
"The U.S. will focus on providing critical strategic assets and other essential support to help South Korea deter and defend against North Korea's nuclear and other WMD threats," she added. WMD is short for weapons of mass destruction.
The mention in the NDS of "critical" U.S. support appears to reiterate America's commitment to using its nuclear weapons as part of its "extended deterrence" for the Asian ally that now boasts a conventional defense edge over the North whose military operates with aging conventional equipment, analysts said.
In last year's joint fact sheet outlining bilateral security and trade agreements, the Trump administration officially reaffirmed its pledge to provide extended deterrence that leverages the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear assets.
"The NDS indicates that it would guarantee the nuclear umbrella while South Korea undertakes the conventional capability part (to deal with North Korea)," Nam Chang-hee, professor of international politics at Inha University, said.
"Should the nuclear umbrella commitment waver, South Korea would have two options -- going nuclear or drastically increasing its conventional force with assets, such as a Hyunmoo-5 missile, that are powerful enough to create a balance of terror with Pyongyang," he added, referring to what is dubbed a "monster" missile for its formidable destructive power.
Notably, the NDS made clear that it seeks to "upgrade" U.S. force posture in Korea amid speculation that Washington could adjust the mission, operational scope and makeup of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) that has long been an Army-centric force focusing primarily on handling North Korean threats, as it pursues a broader USFK role for regional crises, including Taiwan contingencies.
The USFK posture has been part of ongoing discussions between Seoul and Washington over "alliance modernization." A change in the USFK troop level or posture has already been much talked about in the public discourse as senior U.S. defense officials have stressed the importance of "capabilities" rather than troop numbers.
"It implies greater flexibility in the future USFK force posture, which might involve rotating or relocating U.S. forces to other locations in the region based on U.S. strategic priorities," Kim said.
Some observers said that the U.S. may want to reduce the Army portion of the USFK and increase its Air Force and Navy portions in a way that would help optimize the USFK force configuration for China-related contingencies.
"My view is that (the NDS) appears to be sort of a documentation consolidating the U.S. move toward the USFK focusing on the Taiwan issue rather than the defense of the Korean Peninsula," Nam said.
"The U.S.' greatest interest lies in the question of how to curb China's rise beyond just preventing an attack on Taiwan, when South Korea is increasingly capable of maintaining deterrence against North Korean threats with the U.S. nuclear umbrella providing more stability in the defense efforts."
The NDS' call for South Korea to take primary defense responsibility boded well for the Lee administration's push to retake wartime OPCON within its five-year term that ends in 2030, observers said.
The allies have been working on the "conditions-based" OPCON transition. The conditions include South Korea's capabilities to lead combined Korea-U.S. forces, its strike and air defense capabilities, and a regional security environment conducive to such a handover.
"I would say that the Trump administration's call for a balance of responsibility within the alliance does create a favorable environment for both countries to revisit the wartime operation control issues with greater momentum," Kim said.
South Korea handed over operational control of its troops to the U.S.-led U.N. Command during the 1950-53 Korean War. It was then transferred to the two allies' Combined Forces Command when the command was launched in 1978. Wartime OPCON remains in U.S. hands, while South Korea retook peacetime OPCON in 1994.
Ahead of the NDS' release, questions continued over whether the document would mention the goal of North Korea's denuclearization as Trump has committed to pursuing the "complete" denuclearization of the North.
Like the 2022 version, the 2026 NDS did not mention the denuclearization goal. Released by the White House in December, the National Security Strategy (NSS) also had no mention of the denuclearization objective.
Nam raised the possibility that the Pentagon decided not to mention the objective to ensure that Trump can get as much leverage as possible amid expectations that he will seek to resume talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un when he visits China for a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in April.
Kim said that the absence or delay in referring to that goal in a U.S. strategic document may be due to internal disagreements within the U.S. government over North Korea's denuclearization, or "political indecision" that leaves the door open for dialogue with Pyongyang.
Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to reengage with Kim. During his first term, he had three in-person meetings with Kim as a result of his personal diplomacy: the first summit in Singapore in June 2018, the second in Hanoi in February 2019 and the third at the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjom in June 2019.
In May, the Pentagon said that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth tasked Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to draw up a new NDS to prioritize raising "burden-sharing" with allies and deterring China threats in the Indo-Pacific. Its release came ahead of Colby's reported trip to South Korea and Japan.
The NDS outlines the Pentagon's defense objectives and policy direction in line with the NSS.
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